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In 2017 it was reported that Ahmed Fahour, CEO of Australia Post – a 
publicly owned company – earned AUD$10.8 million in a single year. In 
2015, he was paid 119 times the annual salary of the average Australia 
Post employee ($47,000 per annum). Fahour presided over the 
organisation's greatest decline in company turnover, accompanied by 
large-scale retrenchments of low-paid workers (Evershed, 2017). Yet as 
extravagant as Fahour’s pay appears, it is far from the largest executive 
remuneration packages paid to CEOs in Australia. In recent years, some 
have surpassed $30 million per annum. In the United States (US), CEO 
pay can be 300 times that of the average wage within the company 
(Mishel and Davis, 2015). Even after a slight ‘correction’ in CEO pay, 
which dipped in Australia during the Global Financial Crisis from an 
average of $5.5 million per annum to $4.7 million, David Richardson of 
The Australia Institute has recently found that CEO pay is on the rise 
again, averaging $5.2 million last financial year (Patty, 2018; 
Richardson, 2018). 
Pay disparities between senior management and workers in the English-
speaking global metropole – primarily Australia, UK, and the US – have 
intensified over the last three decades. At the beginning of the 1980s in 
the US, pay ratios ran at about 20:1. Management theorists such as Peter 
Drucker first suggested in 1977 that any increase in a 20:1 ratio would 
result in ‘resentment and falling morale’ within companies, eroding the 
collective effort and trust upon which business depends (Wartzman, 
2011). In the UK and Australia at that time, average pay ratios stood at a 
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modest 15:1. Today, that figure in Australia and the UK is 183:1 (Walker, 
2016), while in the US some executives earn 373 times the salary of an 
average rank-and-file worker (High Pay Centre [HPC], 2014; AFLCIO, 
2015). Meanwhile, corporate regulation implemented since the 1980s 
appears to have encouraged, rather than stemmed, pay disparity and 
lavish executive remuneration.  
Pay disclosure regulation is designed to reduce pay disparity. The most 
common form of pay disclosure – pay ratios – involves a comparison 
between the salary package of the highest paid company employee 
(usually the CEO) with the median salary package within the company, 
calculated by averaging the pay of all workers in the company, including 
low-paid foreign workers and executive employees (e.g. 15:1). These 
measurements of income disparity have recently gained popularity across 
the global north in the wake of the 2007 global financial crisis (GFC). In 
the US, former President Barack Obama invoked the language of pay 
ratios to illustrate pay disparity, saying that ‘the typical CEO who used to 
earn about 30 times more than his or her worker now earns 110 times 
more’ (Quigg, 2011). The Obama Administration introduced mandatory 
disclosure of pay ratios into US corporate law in 2010. Similar regulatory 
mechanisms involving disclosure of executive pay were implemented in 
Australia in 2009, but they did not require the formulation of pay ratios. 
In reducing CEO pay, pay disclosure models rely on the mechanism of 
public ‘shame’ to convince shareholders to exercise voting rights within 
companies to block excessive executive remuneration packages. In other 
words, the system relies on the will of shareholders. In Australia and the 
US, current pay disclosure models have resulted in a modest reduction in 
CEO pay, fractionally narrowing pay disparity from the top down by 
redistributing wealth to shareholders (discussed in more detail below). 
These schemes have not, however, increased the real wages of workers. 
Accordingly, it is claimed here that pay disclosure regulation has not had 
any significant impact on reducing income disparity.  
This argument relies on a number of key terms and distinctions clarified 
here before further discussion. The distinction between income and 
wealth, for instance, conceives of the former as a flow and the latter as a 
stock (of assets) (Stilwell and Jordan, 2007: 46). The distinction between 
CEO ‘salary’ and ‘remuneration’ is also important, given that bonus 
payments, equity plans, stock options and even private school fees and 
chauffeurs mean that CEOs receive other forms of payment, significantly 
exceeding their base salary, that are often standard terms of remuneration 
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packages (HPC, 2015). This broader understanding of pay or 
remuneration is adopted here. Further, this article is mostly concerned 
with the pay of CEOs rather than a wider stratum of senior managers, 
predominantly due to the limited availability of international data relating 
to senior managers.  
This article discusses pay disclosure as a mechanism to regulate pay 
disparities and explores why this form of regulation has had a limited 
impact. In doing so, it is acknowledged that pay disclosure does provide 
some benefit in enhancing accountability, raising social awareness, and 
supplying policy makers and analysts (such as the author) with data. The 
article also analyses situations where pay disclosure has worked well to 
control pay disparity, identifying key factors involved in such an 
outcome. In doing so, the article locates the discussion of pay disclosure 
in a field of contestation between shareholder value and stakeholder 
approaches to corporate governance and regulation. The first of these 
approaches focuses on corporate governance, while the latter sees its 
corporate concerns more aligned with regulation. Contributors from the 
ranks of the former have explained pay disparity in terms of its 
relationship to corporate shareholder value (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-
Mejia, 2002; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Levinthal, 1988).  Those from the 
latter – largely critical political economists – have identified and 
represented pay disparity as a significant mechanism in generating social 
inequality and the adverse impacts it creates for wide-ranging social 
stakeholders – workers, consumers and environmental groups (Atkinson, 
2015; Piketty, 2014, Mitchell et al, 2005; Blanpain et al, 2011; Stilwell 
and Jordan, 2007; Shields, 2005).  
Current evidence suggests that when pay disclosure is implemented for 
the benefit of shareholders – that is, in accordance with the dominant 
shareholder value model of corporate governance – it can reduce CEO 
pay. Some Australian shareholders appear to have recognised what a 
number of academic commentators have understood for many years: that 
CEO ‘pay for performance’ has only a limited value in enhancing the 
value of shares (Tyson and Bournois, 2005; Shields, 2005; Kenny, 2017). 
Further, as this article points out, this form of pay disclosure does not 
generate any benefit to social stakeholders such as workers, consumer 
and environmental groups, or the state. Under the shareholder value 
model, pay disclosure merely reduces the gap between the highest and 
average paid workers  by lowering the pay of CEOs and executives and 
redistributing the savings to shareholders, not workers. Some, however, 
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have supported pay disclosure regulation in what appears to be a false 
hope that it will have some material effect on wealth redistribution to 
stakeholders such as higher wages for workers or lower prices for 
consumers (see, for example, the High Pay Centre, the AFLCIO Mohan 
et al (2015), discussed below). It is hard to see how stakeholders such as 
workers and consumers could materially benefit from CEO pay restraint. 
By contrast, stakeholder approaches to reducing pay disparity can 
include pay disclosure, but applied in combination with taxation or 
enhanced industrial rights, to redistribute executive pay to social 
stakeholders, including workers. Such an approach addresses pay 
disparity as well as the broader problem of social inequality.  
There is a political context for these concerns. Inequality has risen as a 
major political issue in the US, the UK and Australia in the wake of the 
GFC. This is exemplified by the strength of the Bernie Sanders’ bid for 
the Democratic nomination in the 2016 US Presidential election and the 
unexpectedly strong showing of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour Party leader 
in the 2017 UK general election, both of whom campaigned against 
inequality. In Australia, concern over growing inequality was ignited by 
the raft of inequitable measures proposed in the Abbott government’s 
2014 (‘Hockey’) budget, and the Australian Labor Party went close to 
toppling the government in the 2016 federal election in a campaign that 
featured previously ‘unthinkable’ policies to reduce the capital gains tax 
and limit negative gearing for property owners. The ALP subsequently 
announced a more explicit ‘Agenda for Tackling Inequality’, including 
reducing tax advantages for discretionary trusts and restoring the penalty 
ratesrecently reduced for low paid workers. The proposals suggested here 
could be considered as complementing that document.  
This article is structured in two parts. The first part critically reviews the 
literature on shareholder value to set the scene for a discussion of the 
relationship between pay disclosure regulation and pay disparity in 
Australia, the US and UK. It also presents three case studies 
demonstrating the consequences of Australian pay disclosure regulation 
for both shareholders and stakeholders in Australian companies. The 
second part analyses social stakeholder approaches to pay disparity, 
before undertaking a review of policy interventions that rely on pay 
disclosure regulation to narrow pay disparity. Discussion of corporate 
and regulatory practice in both sections is framed using a political 
economy approach.  
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Shareholder value and pay disclosure regulation in 
Australia 
Scholars of corporate governance tend to represent pay disparity as a 
function of ‘shareholder value’. This embodies the neoliberal principle 
that the primary duty of corporate management is to enhance the value of 
the company for the benefit of shareholders (Friedman, 1970). Those 
who subscribe to it adhere to the ‘managerial power’ model of corporate 
governance (Bebchuck and Fried, 2004; Gumbel, 2006: 222) whereby 
the interests of shareholders are best served by maximising executive 
remuneration through ‘CEO-pay-for–performance’ (Grabke-Rundell and 
Gomez-Mejia, 2002; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Levinthal, 1988). It is 
noted that the lack of evidence linking high CEO pay to increased 
productivity has led French economist, Thomas Piketty, to see 
performance pay as part of an ‘apparatus of justification’ within orthodox 
economics (2014: 330-355). There is, nevertheless, some emerging 
evidence suggesting that pay disclosure regulation under shareholder 
value models has reduced CEO pay and, by extension, pay disparity in 
Australia (Bugeja et al, 2016). As the following will explain, however, 
these reductions in pay disparity have been modest and have had no 
impact on the redistribution of wealth beyond a narrow legal and social 
class of shareholders.  
The shareholder value model became part of the law  in Australia under 
the Howard Liberal Government’s Corporations Act (CA) 2001. Under 
this Act, the power to select CEOs and set executive remuneration rests 
with company managers or boards of directors (Sheehan, 2009: 280; CA, 
ss. 198A, 201J, 202A, 204F). However, a range of regulatory 
interventions has strengthened the power of shareholders within 
companies while challenging executive power. The CA was implemented 
amidst a range of public policies geared toward the marketisation of 
social life, the privatisation of publicly owned companies and the 
encouragement of ‘mum and dad shareholders’. The Act sought to 
‘democratise’ the shareholder value model through a range of executive 
pay disclosure mechanisms, primarily for the benefit of shareholders. Yet 
these measures proved somewhat limited, prompting the Rudd-Gillard 
Governments to pass amendments to the Act in 2009 – in particular, to 
tighten pay disclosure requirements to shareholders (discussed further 
below).   
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This era of pay disclosure regulation intensified in the mid-2000s 
following a range of corporate scandals involving large payments to 
departing CEOs. Amendments to the Act required listed companies to 
disclose the complete remuneration packages (including base salary, 
short-and long-term incentives and other payments and allowances) of all 
directors and the five most highly paid executives (CA, s. 300A; PC). 
This information is now required to be set out in a ‘Remuneration 
Report’ that forms part of a company’s compulsory annual reporting 
obligations (CA, s. 300A). Remuneration disclosed by these reports is 
subject to a non-binding, advisory shareholder vote (CA, s. 250R). 
Further reform to executive pay regulation was precipitated by the GFC 
in 2007 and the election of a Labor Government that ordered a review 
into executive remuneration. The review rejected proposals to include 
workers in the determination of executive pay and to impose salary caps 
on executive remuneration, claiming that such measures would be 
difficult to implement in practice and could disadvantage some 
businesses in relation to others (Fels, 2010). The review did, however, 
introduce some changes to corporate regulation.  
Arguably the most effective in relation to reducing pay disparity was the 
‘two-strikes’ rule, permitting shareholders to vote to reject excessive 
executive remuneration packages. The rule ensures that a 25 per cent 
vote by shareholders against executive pay packages (detailed in the 
remuneration report at company Annual General Meetings (AGM)) will 
force a board of directors to reconsider an executive pay package (CA, s. 
250U): this is the first strike. Once the board has reconsidered the pay 
package, a second ‘strike’ (another 25 per cent vote) against a second 
proposed pay package by the board will result in dissolution of the entire 
board of directors with all seats vacated for re-election within 90 days 
(CA, ss. 250V, 250W). 
A number of two-strikes-rule votes were delivered by shareholders 
against Australia’s largest remuneration packages just months after the 
implementation of the rule in 2011 (Hill, 2015: 67). Since the rule’s 
inception, around 14 per cent of Australian listed companies have 
reported shareholder intervention in the determination of executive pay 
packages at AGMs using the two strikes rule (Featherstone, 2017). In 
2016, shareholders within 15 of Australia’s largest companies took 
advantage of the protest vote laws (Durkin, 2016). A study conducted by 
the Centre for International Finance and Regulation demonstrated that, 
after a first strike, CEO pay fell by 20 per cent in the following year, 
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while, after a second strike, it fell by as much as 32 per cent (Bugeja et 
al, 2016). In so doing, these laws reduced pay disparity by redistributing 
company profits to shareholders (ASX, 2017). Notably, however, this 
internal corporate wealth redistribution has remained precisely that. 
There has been no discernible 'trickle-down' increase in income or wealth 
beyond the corporate sphere (discussed below by reference to widening 
gaps in social inequality). The following three short case studies 
demonstrate this pattern. 
Case Study 1 
In 2011, a first strike was delivered against the remuneration packages at 
Crown Resorts. The board reacted by cutting CEO pay from $7.7 million 
p.a. to $6.9 million per annum in the following year (Remuneration 
Report, 2012: 72; Kitney, 2012). After the vote, earnings per share (as 
distinct from share-price) more than doubled between 2011 and 2014, to 
over 90 cents per share and large dividends were issued to the company’s 
largest shareholders (Annual Report, 2014: 13), including a payment of 
$387 million to James Packer, who will be paid an estimated $1.1 billion 
over the next three years (Ward, 2017). Packer is also a non-executive 
director of the company. But these shareholder gains have had only a 
marginal impact on stakeholders. Since 2011, the casino employee union, 
United Voice, has managed to negotiate a small 3.75 per cent pay rise for 
workers (United Voice, 2017); but in 2017, the casino company decided 
to sack its poker machine technicians, replacing them with contractors 
who are paid half of what they currently earn - $76,000 per annum 
(Hannan, 2017). 
Case Study 2 
Wesfarmers was struck by two separate shareholder votes against 
executive pay in 2009 and 2011 respectively (Mayne, 2011). 
Accordingly, the board agreed to reduce CEO pay by $4 million p.a. 
(Kenny, 2017). The responsiveness of the board to these shareholder 
strikes has coincided with a 20 per cent increase in the annual price paid 
per share over the last five years (Annual Report, 2017). Stakeholders did 
not share the windfall and in 2015, Coles, a major subsidiary of 
Wesfarmers, underpaid 77,000 part-time and casual workers below award 
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wages by $70 million (Schneiders et al, 2016), disadvantaging some low-
paid workers by as much as $3,500 per annum each (Toscano and 
Schneiders, 2016). Coles continues to resist efforts by the relevant union 
– the Shop Distributive & Allied Employees Association (SDA) – to 
increase pay for its lowest-paid workers.  
Case Study 3 
Bluescope Steel suffered a vote against executive pay in 2011 when the 
company lost $1 billion and the share price fell from $11 to 70c. The 
following year, executives responded by agreeing to a salary freeze and a 
67 per cent cut in bonuses (Tan, 2012). Since then, the share price has 
steadily increased from earnings per share of 57.50 cents in 2011 
(Annual Financial Report, 2010/2011: 2) more than doubling to $1.25 in 
June 2017, (Directors’ Report 2017: 14), while share prices reached 
$13.70 in July 2017. These shareholder gains followed the pattern 
identified above, with profits bypassing stakeholders other than 
shareholders. Workers continued to fare badly: 1000 jobs were axed in 
2011, and in 2015 steelworkers agreed to the loss of a further 500 jobs 
and wage freezes to prevent the closure of the Port Kembla Steelworks 
(Loussikian, 2015).  
These case studies provide evidence of the efficacy of pay disclosure 
regulation in narrowing pay disparity between stakeholders and 
executives, as well as the relationship between CEO pay and 
shareholders. They show that when company boards are responsive to 
pay disclosure regulation and act to reduce excessive executive pay, 
shareholders tend to see greater returns. Conversely, these observations 
also suggest that such returns are not passed onto stakeholders other than 
shareholders and sometimes come at their expense. While these trends in 
shareholder gains and other stakeholder losses are unlikely to be 
exclusively linked to two-strikes votes, findings from a wider study on 
the relationship between CEO pay and shareholders supports the link 
presented here (Bugeja, et al, 2016). It is noted that this study did not 
consider the interests of stakeholders.  
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Shareholder value and pay disclosure regulation in the 
United States and Britain 
Shareholder value models have dominated corporate governance and 
regulation in the United States and Britain since the aftermath of the 
Great Depression, when shareholders were first given the capacity to 
vote on certain decisions proposed by company boards of directors at 
company meetings. Since the emergence of ‘pay-for-performance’ 
ideology, predominantly in the US in the 1980s, however, shareholders 
have failed to act to alleviate large scale and rapid growth in executive 
remuneration (Zylberstajn, 2011). This sustained trend has seen pay 
disclosure strategies to regulate CEO pay, such as pay ratios, gain 
popularity. As discussed, the US has recently implemented pay ratio 
disclosure, while British measures to introduce mandatory reporting of 
pay ratios are gaining momentum. Within these respective national 
regulatory contexts, pay disclosure strategies are designed to enhance 
shareholder power and ‘value’.   
Following the GFC, the US Government imposed a new regulatory 
framework on corporate America through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (or ‘Dodd-Frank Act’ (Pub.L. 
111-203, H.R. 4173)). Many of the regulations imposed by the Act would 
have been unthinkable in the pre-crisis era. Accomplished through the 
bipartisan draftsmanship of Republican Senator Barney Frank and 
Democrat Senator Chris Dodd, the Act aims to achieve ‘financial 
stability’ through greater corporate regulation. As well as benefiting the 
market, the Act was designed with workers and consumers in mind, with 
the peak US union body circulating a petition to have CEO-to-worker 
pay ratios written into law (AFL-CIO, 2012). Together with a range of 
other disclosure mechanisms requiring CEOs to justify their pay by 
reference to firm performance (like the Australian reforms discussed 
above), the Dodd-Frank Act requires companies to disclose CEO-to-
worker pay ratios as well as the frequently substantial inequalities 
between them. To this extent, the Act has been acclaimed by both labour 
unions and then President Obama as a win for the labour movement and 
social equality more generally (Quigg, 2011; Milligan, 2015). 
Accordingly, the new law might disclose wider social inequalities 
associated with the gender pay-gap which, at the time the law was passed 
in the US, saw women in full-time employment earning 77 cents for 
every dollar earned by men (De Navas-Walt, Proctor and Smith, 2011: 5, 
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12). The Act takes the progressive step of requiring that the pay of casual 
and part-time employees, as well as companies’ ‘offshore’ workers, is 
calculated when determining the average pay of employees on one side 
of the pay ratio (USSEC, 2015).  
Nevertheless, US pay ratio laws remain entrenched within the 
shareholder value model of corporate governance. American finance 
commentator, Michael Hiltzik, suggests that these laws merely enhance 
disclosure of CEO pay and encourage greater self-regulation. In doing 
so, they ‘further chisel the myth of shareholder value in the rules of 
corporate behaviour’. Without a public enforcement mechanism, the US 
experience of pay ratios suggests that disclosure alone is not enough to 
both decrease and redistribute CEO pay to stakeholders. Hiltzik points to 
elements of the Act’s shareholder value framework and the performance-
for-pay rule as leading to an increase in ‘predatory pricing, skimping on 
product quality, mistreatment of suppliers, and the manipulation of local 
communities to extract tax breaks and subsidies for factory locations’, all 
of which ‘reflect the drive to upstream all corporate returns to the 
shareholders’ (Hiltzik, 2015).  
The US study of Mohan et al (2015), perhaps misleadingly entitled, 
‘Paying Up for Fair Pay’, has documented the effect of pay ratios on 
consumer behaviour. It shows that disclosure of pay ratios in relation to 
US products does in fact change patterns of consumption by empowering 
consumers with knowledge to make ‘ethical’ consumer decisions 
(Mohan, et al, 2015). In this way, the study concludes that pay ratios 
might be seen as a competitive market mechanism to drive down CEO 
pay from the supermarket aisle up. Even so, there is no evidence that 
such ‘ethical consumerism’ leads to any discernible material advantage 
or benefit being passed onto consumers or workers. It is conceded that 
evidence linking falling CEO pay to median pay increases or consumer 
savings is difficult to gauge. Nevertheless, the case studies of pay 
disclosure regulation and the intensification of worker-stakeholder 
exploitation, discussed above in respect to Australia, provide a 
compelling insight into the division between pay disclosure regulation 
and material improvements for stakeholders. 
Other critiques point to the fact that these laws fail to adequately define 
executive remuneration, omitting certain types of equity-based 
performance pay that accrues over time. Executive pay-watch expert 
Rosanna Landis Weaver suggests that these forms of payment mean that 
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‘if an executive has just received a massive options grant, he might look 
underpaid this year, but overpaid in 10 years when he cashes it in’ 
(Weaver, quoted in Anderson, 2016). 
The British High Pay Centre (HPC, 2015) claims to have addressed some 
of these failings of the US pay ratio system in proposals for a pay ratio 
regime in Britain. The calculation of pay ratios under the British model, 
for instance, is more comprehensive than under the existing US model 
and involves two salient points. First, the employee side of the ratio must 
reflect the average pay of all workers within the company (including 
overseas workers and those reclassified as ‘independent contractors’). 
Such a method is used by British retail firm John Lewis, which deploys 
the term, ‘non-management partners’ to describe workers and others 
whose pay is accounted for on one side of the ratio (HPC, 2015:24). 
Second, CEO pay on the other side of the ratio must include their total 
remuneration, not merely single figure or realised pay, as in the case of 
the US Dodd-Frank Act (HPC, 2015). As mentioned above, such a figure 
accounts for future bonuses and a lengthy list of non-taxable benefits, 
ranging from the provision of free chauffeurs to private school fees.  
Like corporate regulation in the US, the Companies Act 2006 (UK) 
adopts a strong ‘shareholder value’ approach, affording shareholders a 
range of decision-making power about the governance of the company 
and the removal of directors. Interestingly, however, in its most recent 
report, the HPC states that the objective of amending the Companies Act 
to include pay ratios is not necessarily to enhance shareholder value or 
rights within the company (HPC, 2015: 49). According to the HPC, the 
objectives of pay ratios are to provide an accountable framework for the 
calculation of executive pay by: (i) holding executives to account to 
shareholders and stakeholders alike for ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour and 
differential treatment; (ii) altering existing market-based formulations in 
which companies simply compare the pay package of their CEO to those 
of CEOs in similar positions (resulting in a zero-sum game which, over 
time, has ratcheted-up CEO pay and increased managerial power); (iii) 
calculating CEO pay, not on the basis of market equivalencies, but for 
value to the organisation; (iv) comparing the work of CEOs with other 
stakeholders within the company; (v) measuring pay in terms of 
creativity, competence, responsibility and their ability to add value to the 
company. These discursive or ‘behind the scenes’ aspects of pay ratios, 
say the HPC, mean that pay ratios value the work of all company 
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employees, not simply senior managers, improving fairness in the way 
that CEO pay is calculated.  
These measures may result in a small reduction to CEO pay and a 
redistribution of company resources to shareholders, as in the case of 
Australian pay disclosure regulation. But, like the Australian and US 
regulatory context, these proposed British laws do not appear to actually 
effect a redistribution of company resources to stakeholders (and in fact 
contradict pay disclosure models recommended by a 2014 HPC report, 
discussed below). The HPC’s latest claims in respect to redistribution of 
company resources are speculative, to say the least, suggesting that 
‘money distributed to executives … could of course (be) retained for 
investment, for example in technological advances…(or) training’, 
leading to enhanced ‘productivity’. The HPC nevertheless concedes that, 
‘in most cases … this is not so’ (HPC, 2015: 38). That is, the HPC now 
concedes that pay disclosure will probably not redistribute executive pay 
to stakeholders. Such a concession appears to acknowledge the limited 
capacity of pay disclosure regulation to narrow pay disparity.  
Another problem with the UK pay ratio proposal is that it lacks a clear 
mechanism of enforcement, even to merely enhance shareholder value. 
British researchers have argued that pay ratios operate through powerful 
social motivators such as shame, embarrassment and humiliation, arising 
from relationships between CEOs, shareholders and stakeholders (HPC, 
2015) and that, rather than relying on a vote of shareholders, executives 
will be shamed into rescinding some of their earnings. As evidence of the 
embarrassment that surrounds high pay, the HPC points to the reluctance 
of the business lobby to share remuneration details of their wealthiest 
executives (HPC, 2015: 46-47). However, as some trade unionists have 
argued, even if executives are required by law to disclose their earnings 
in the form of a pay ratio, ‘how do you shame people who are 
shameless?’ (cited in Moore, 2017). Indeed, the brief experience of 
mandatory pay ratio disclosure in the US shows that pay ratios alone 
have led to little change in executive remuneration practice. In Australia, 
where pay disclosure within the largest companies has been required by 
law for at least five years, CEOs have not been stirred by shame to 
sacrifice their pay. Rather, where pay disclosure has worked to reduce 
CEO pay, it has done so in coordination with other regulation (discussed 
below) or strong binding votes by shareholders to reduce CEO pay and 
redistribute the proceeds among themselves.   
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Accordingly, the British proposals do not overcome the problems 
inherent within the US and Australian models, derived from a 
shareholder value regulatory framework. In this sense, pay disclosure 
regulation does not take a ‘stick’ to pay disparity: rather it appears to 
wave a magic wand. It merely suggests redistribution to stakeholders 
rather than actually requiring it. 
The social stakeholder approach to pay disparity 
Shareholder value approaches to pay disparity have been challenged 
primarily by social stakeholder theorists from within the fields of 
corporate law, industrial relations and business management. Beginning 
with Lord William Wedderburn in the early 1980s, their solutions to pay 
disparity have been less concerned with corporate governance than with 
the redistribution of power and material resources from the owners and 
managers of capital (CEOs and shareholders) to other ‘stakeholders’ such 
as workers and their unions as well as and consumer and environmental 
groups (see, for instance, Mitchell et al. 2005 and Blanpain et al. 2011). 
This group have been joined in their opposition to shareholder value 
models by political economists, who have contested the political 
legitimacy of corporate governance and understood pay disparity as an 
issue of social inequality and inequity. Their heterodox approaches, such 
as those taken by Thomas Piketty (2014), Anthony Atkinson (2015) and, 
in an Australian context,  Stilwell and Jordan (2007), have explained pay 
inequality as being entrenched within the prevailing form of neoliberal 
globalisation and the dynamics of capital. At the heart of this 
reinvigorated stakeholder perspective is an emphasis on the dispersion of 
wealth, rather than income, and the role it plays in enduring and 
intractable social relations of inequality, including corporate pay 
disparity. Piketty, for example, suggests that the extent of pay disparities 
between executive management and most paid workers may be 
understood as a telling indicator of a global historical dynamic in which 
1 per cent of the world’s population own 50 per cent of the world’s 
wealth. Using the same methodology, Oxfam has recently shown that the 
world’s eight richest men own the same amount as half of the world’s 
population (2017).  
A significant reason for this inequality is the material difference between 
income and wealth. Whereas income is a flow of wealth over time, 
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usually exchanged for work or services and consumed by daily 
expenditure, wealth is the capacity to derive income from the ownership 
of assets without the need to work for other people. (Pen, 1973; Stilwell, 
1993; 2007; Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 2015). Where the overwhelming 
majority of stakeholders earn income, the overwhelming majority of 
shareholders are wealthy. This has been confirmed by several significant 
studies since 2002,showing that the wealthiest 10 per cent of Australian 
households own 61 per cent of liquid assets, such as shares (Headey et al, 
2005: 165; HILDA, 2002, Sheil and Stilwell, 2016). The bottom line is 
that, where enhanced executive pay disclosure has benefited 
shareholders, it has not redistributed wealth, but rather reorganised 
ownership of wealth among the wealthy. Additionally, high executive 
income has intensified ownership of liquid wealth by the wealthiest one 
per cent (Piketty, 2014: 355, 658). 
It is in the context of these larger historical global trends of social 
inequality that high managerial incomes have made an impact. As 
mentioned previously, high incomes have increased extremely rapidly 
and in a short time, permitting CEOs of large companies to amass a 
significant share of the functional distribution of income, compared to 
other workers, with seemingly little justification. Writing in this journal, 
John Shields, showed within the 16 year period 1989-2005 Australian 
executive pay increased by 564%. In the same period, the wages of full-
time adult male employees increased by 85%. To describe this 
relationship, Shields deployed a pay ratio between CEO and average 
earnings, showing that the ratio increased from 18:1 to 63:1 (Shields, 
2005: 302). As discussed at the outset of this article, ratios of over 100:1 
are now commonplace in Australia’s largest companies. Today, where 
minimum salaries for members of the 1 per cent start at around $227,534 
per year, salaries of the 0.1 per cent begin at around $600,625 per year 
(Martin, 2015).  
These trends in pay inequality, identified by Shields over a decade ago, 
have continued into the present. While profits soar, real wages stagnate 
and wage growth is at an all-time low. In the December quarter of 2016, 
profits surged by 20.1 per cent while wages fell by 0.5 per cent (Janda, 
2017). Australian rates of jobless poverty are the second worst in the 
OECD (OECD, 2015). So too are rates of underemployment which 
continue to grow as the creation of new part-time and casual employment 
outstrips the creation of  full-time jobs by two-to-one (ABS, 2017). At 
the bottom of the waged hierarchy, workers earn a minimum wage of 
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$34,980.40 per annum, before tax, for a 38-hour week across most 
Australian industries (FWO, 2017). In 2017, the Fair Work Commission  
announced a cut in ‘penalty rates’ – the minimum pay for overtime and 
irregular working hours, usually associated with the work of the lowest 
paid workers in the hospitality and miscellaneous employment sectors.  
The  work of UK economist, Anthony Atkinson, echoes Shields’ findings 
and also brings to the debate a practical list of regulatory proposals to 
minimise inequality, primarily through heterodox and Keynesian 
economic policies (2015: 151-153; 302-304). In emphasising the 
importance of workers as stakeholders in the running of private firms, 
Atkinson (2015) and the HPC (in 2014) proposed a range of measures 
involving pay disclosure within large companies. Unlike examples of pay 
disclosure allied to shareholder value, discussed above, their proposals 
are linked to policies designed to redistribute corporate wealth to 
stakeholders (2015, 153). Taken together, these measures include policies 
such as: (i) pay limits or maximum pay ratios, meaning that executives 
cannot earn more than a certain multiple of their lowest-paid employee; 
(ii) representation for workers on company boards and remuneration 
committees; (iii) increasing the top-rate of income tax; (iv) company-
wide profit sharing; (v) and a new Companies Act with legally-binding 
provisions to ensure equal pay for equal work. Each of these measures is 
examined in turn below. Such proposals are supported by the work of 
other stakeholder theorists, such as Mitchell and his colleagues (2005: 
419), who have suggested that both corporate and industrial interests are 
interconnected and that companies must be regulated in a manner that 
reflects this complementarity through a regulatory coupling of corporate 
and labour law. The work of these stakeholder theorists indicates that pay 
disclosure is more likely to be effective in lowering pay disparity 
between workers and CEOs when linked to other regulatory strategies 
that change the social relations of production.   
Pay limits or maximum pay ratios 
The practice of using pay ratios to structure limits on executive pay and 
set wages relative to the earnings of executives existed long before the 
use of pay ratios as a mere disclosure mechanism that benefits 
shareholders. In fact, the use of pay ratios to enforce fair pay has a 
significant history over the course of the twentieth century, evolving in 
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Europe at the same time as shareholder value regulation was 
commencing in the US and UK. Its origins can be traced to the Basque 
region of Spain in the 1950s. It was here that a federation of worker co-
operatives, together with the Catholic Church, established the 
Mondragon Corporation, a collectivist (sometimes called ‘anarcho-
syndicalist’) manufacturing corporation in which a form of pay 
disclosure – pay ratios – has been relied upon to constrain pay disparity 
in the workplace by redistributing profits to workers. Such use of pay 
ratios, central to the corporate structure of Mondragon, is often cited as 
the reason for the company’s continuing success (although one 
commentator has noted a recent decline in certain overstretched 
multinational arms of the company (Errasti et al, 2017)). Ratios within 
the company are decided periodically, not by shareholders, but by 
workers through a democratic vote. In these circumstances, ratios 
between the highest and lowest paid workers range from around 3:1 to 
9:1, but frequently average around 5:1 (Herrera, 2004). On this basis, 
employees at Mondragon earn comparatively more than workers with 
similar skills at other companies in Spain and globally (Flecha 2011: 
161). The system of industrial democracy at Mondragon also means that, 
when the market takes a downturn, workers vote to decrease wages in the 
interests of maintaining full employment within the company (Tremlett, 
2013). The Mondragon model has been transplanted to other centres of 
industry around the world, including the US where it has been embraced 
by the United Steelworkers in 2009 resulting in the Ohio Employee 
Ownership Center (OEOC), a co-operatively run union steel workshop in 
which pay ratios are central to the organisation of the business.  
Similar proposals have recently been debated in Switzerland where a 
constitutional referendum on regulating pay disparity resulted in a 
landslide victory. Proposals to ban compensation and large payouts, or 
‘golden parachutes’, for departing CEOs gained an overwhelming 68 per 
cent support of the vote (BBC, 2013). A separate referendum proposal to 
introduce mandatory 1:12 pay ratios within Swiss companies 
nevertheless foundered, but only by a slim margin (Garofalo, 2013). 
Meanwhile, British Labour Party leader, Jeremy Corbyn, has recently 
called on the use of pay ratios to impose a maximum wage law or cap 
(Elgot, 2017), suggesting that ‘pay ratios between top and bottom’ would 
mean ‘that the rewards don’t just accrue to those at the top’ (Corbyn, 
2016). These proposals, along with the ratios established at Mondragon, 
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are suggestive of the tolerable limits of pay ‘disparity’ while clarifying 
what relative ‘parity’ might look like. 
Enforceable pay limits under the Mondragon model pay ratio model 
mean that a significant amount of company profit, that might otherwise 
be paid to executives in excessive remuneration, is reinvested into the 
company to enhance firm productivity. Similarly, Stilwell and others 
have suggested that excess CEO salaries might be reinvested in 
technology and education both within and outside the corporation 
(Stilwell, 2002; see also, Goldin and Katz, 2008: 29, 141, 320-323). 
Representation for workers on company boards and 
remuneration committees 
Perhaps the most favourable option to reduce pay disparity involves 
enhancing democratic processes within corporations by extending 
participation in corporate governance to stakeholders in the industrial 
sphere (Mitchell et al, 2005; Ross and Markey, 2002). Allowing workers 
to set pay by voting, for instance, on a reasonable pay ratio is an effective 
way for companies to decrease pay inequality between their workforces. 
Such a model necessarily requires complete transparency in executive 
pay but connects pay disclosure to possibilities for meaningful 
redistribution of company wealth to stakeholders. As previously shown, 
the success of this stakeholder model has been demonstrated at the 
Mondragon Corporation and its North American subsidiaries. A similar 
approach to pay ratios is the German model of industrial democracy.  
In Germany, since the late nineteenth century, rank and file workers have 
been appointed to company work councils to assist in the co-
determination of company decision-making, including decisions about 
remuneration. The largest German companies are required to have a dual 
board of directors – one supervisory and one management board. By law, 
at least half of the representatives on supervisory boards within large 
companies (those with over 2000 employees) are required to be workers 
within the company (Addison, 2010). German workers also sit on 
corporate remuneration committees, helping to determine executive pay 
by reference to a range of stakeholder interests (TUC, 2012: 4). The 
German system of co-determination and similar models in Scandanavian 
countries have meant that CEOs are paid at least 20 per cent less than 
their US, British and Australian counterparts (Eurostat, 2007). Further, 
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CEOs in German companies with board-level employee representation 
are paid half as much as other CEOs (Hans Bockler Foundation, 2017). 
Draft legislation that is designed to provide dual boards with power to 
use pay ratios to set pay for both workers and executives within the 
company is currently before the Bunderstag. These proposed laws 
provide stakeholders (in this case, workers on supervisory boards) with 
power to index all pay within the company to CEO pay, by reference to a 
pay ratio (Shotter and Chazan, 2017).  
It must be pointed out, however, that German workers are paid around 
11% less than Australian workers (OECD 2017). Nevertheless, German 
unemployment and underemployment rates are roughly half of what they 
are in Australia (Eurostat, 2017; ABS, 2017). Effectively, this means that 
rates of pay disparity and social inequality are lower on a comparative 
societal basis. Conversely, German and Scandanavian firms have seen 
higher rates of labour productivity than in Australia, yielding higher 
returns for investors and shareholders (OECD, 2017). Heterodox 
economists such as Wolfgang Streek and Joel Rogers (1995) have found 
that such outcomes are directly attributable to worker participation in 
internal company strategy to increase productivity. In the face of 
declining rates of unionisation and participation in the Australian 
workforce, work councils may prove an increasingly necessary strategy 
for Australian workers and trade unions to pursue in reducing pay 
disparity by enhancing industrial democracy.  
Taxation 
There is a range of taxation interventions that renders pay disclosure 
more effective in narrowing pay disparity by redistributing company 
wealth to social stakeholders. One such strategy involves identifying 
companies with high pay ratios for higher taxation treatment. After 
disclosure of CEO pay through the Dodd-Frank Act, Portland in Oregon 
(US) has become the first city in the world to tax companies in which 
CEOs earn more than 100 times their median-paid employee. The tax is 
10 per cent of the amount of conventional State business tax. Under this 
model, a company with a 250:1 ratio would pay a 25 per cent tax. The 
tax is expected to raise $2.5 million per annum with funds to be 
redistributed to homeless services within the city (Floum, 2016). This 
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model could certainly be extended to other pay ratio jurisdictions and 
used more widely to reduce pay disparity by redistributing wealth.  
Such an intervention is similar to recommendations by economists such 
as Emmanuel Saez (2002; 2012) to use pay disclosure mechanisms to 
identify a new tax bracket of super-high income earners. As Saez 
suggests, this would permit the state to recoup and redistribute excess 
CEO and executive earnings, narrowing pay disparity by progressively 
reducing the taxation burden on lower income earners. The Australia 
Institute has also suggested placing a cap on taxable deductions from 
CEO remuneration above a certain level and requiring a minimum tax 
rate of 35% for those earning over $300,000 per year (commonly known 
as ‘the Buffett Rule’, after its creator, US billionaire, Warren Buffett) 
(Grudnoff, 2015). While the plan is supported by the ALP left faction in 
Australian federal politics, it is opposed by the dominant right faction 
(Jericho, 2017) and is markedly absent from the current ‘Agenda for 
Tackling Inequality’ (2017).   
Mandatory company-wide profit sharing 
Pay disclosure regulation could be enhanced by being coupled with 
policies of mandatory, company-wide profit-sharing. Such a policy has 
existed in France since the late 1960s. The current, Social Security 
Financing Law 2011-894 (July 28, 2011), applies to companies with 
more than 50 employees. Where such a company increases dividend 
payments to shareholders, above the average dividend payment from 
over the previous two years, the company must compulsorily share 
profits with workers. The law ensures that when shareholders feel the 
benefits of company profits, such as those associated with a 
redistribution of executive pay, workers should prosper too. Under the 
law, payments to workers must not merely be symbolic. Formulas for the 
calculation of such payments, however, differ (Law 360 France’s New 
Legal Framework for Profit Sharing Premiums). The minimum formula 
for the compulsory profit sharing scheme is calculated as 0.5 x (net profit 
– 5 per cent of share capital) x total wage bill/value. In 2009, the 
maximum amount of profit required to be shared to each employee was 
25,731 Euros. The amount paid to workers is open to negotiation with 
unions and workers through a European Work Council model of co-
determined industrial relations. It has been some time since shared profits 
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were measured as a percentage of total income but, on last analysis in the 
1990s, shared profits comprised between 4-6% of French wages 
(Vaughn-Whitehead, 1991: 62; ILO, 1992: 79).  
Such a model is, in part, reliant on a shift in the social relations of 
production that affords stakeholders a meaningful voice within the 
workplace. Nevertheless, where this scheme is mostly enshrined in law, 
there is reason to think that such a scheme could be adopted within an 
adversarial system of industrial relations that operates in a shareholder 
value corporate regulatory context. Unlike maximum pay ratios and pay 
limits, which mostly operate in co-operative firms such as the 
Mondragon Corporation and John Lewis, a key benefit of mandatory, 
company-wide profit sharing is that it redistributes profit from 
shareholders to stakeholders more generally. It might therefore operate 
effectively to reduce pay disparity in firms currently operating under the 
dominant shareholder value model. 
Amending the Corporations Act with legally-binding 
provisions to ensure equal pay for equal work 
Yet another suggestion to narrow pay disparity involves establishing a 
legally-binding Code for setting pay within companies, extending beyond 
existing industrial award systems, minimum wages and remuneration 
committees. As Atkinson suggests (2015: 153), such a Code might 
determine the pay of both high and low paid employees by reference to a 
formula involving equal pay for equal work. Further, this formula would 
not only reduce general pay disparity but also narrow the gender pay gap 
while increasing the pay of migrant workers (Atkinson, 2015: 153). In 
2014, the HPC suggested a similar legally binding Code requiring 
company directors to have regard to a diversity of stakeholders - 
including workers, consumers, partners and the wider society - whenever 
a corporate decision is made, especially those concerning pay (2014: 17).  
Such a policy might be thought of as a form of wage regulation, a policy 
which played a key role in the post-war boom as well as staving-off the 
effects of recession at the end of the ‘Golden Age’ in the early 1970s. It 
was at this time that the regulation of wages and prices to combat 
inflation was a key feature of the British Labour Government of Harold 
Wilson in 1965, the US Nixon administration in 1971 and the Australian 
Hawke Labor Government in the mid-1980s. Wage freezes were not 
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uncommon. However, the focus was less on regulating high wages and 
their growth than with lower paid workers and maintaining productivity. 
They were also part of a centralised system of wage regulation, rather 
than a decentralised model, moderated by an external regulator, such as a 
legally-binding pay Code. 
Conclusion 
Over the past two decades, Australian corporate regulation has, to some 
extent, been responsive to economic crisis and public perceptions of pay 
disparity. However, these responses have relied on shareholders and 
companies to deliver social change through self-regulation. This self-
regulation has been informed by a range of pay disclosure mechanisms. 
The dominant models of such pay disclosure regulation have claimed to 
reduce excessive executive pay but this regulation has had no significant 
impact on increasing the wages of workers, nor benefiting other 
stakeholders. It appears that the beneficiaries of the pay disclosure 
regulation, such as that implemented in Australia and the US, have not 
been all stakeholders but only shareholders. Accordingly, any reduction 
in executive income has added to  the stocks of wealth owned by 
shareholders.  
Serious concern to narrow pay disparity must consider other options to 
enhance the efficacy of pay disclosure regulation by ensuring a wider 
redistribution of wealth and pay between stakeholders and shareholders. 
ALP policymakers currently developing policies to tackle inequality in 
the labour market therefore face a choice. This is between regulation, on 
the one hand, that relies on pay disclosure alone to encourage 
shareholders to reduce pay disparity by enriching themselves or, on the 
other hand, a system of pay disclosure that reduces pay disparity by 
redistributing income from the highest to average paid workers and other 
stakeholders. Taking the latter approach to reducing pay disparity, pay 
disclosure regulation needs to be linked to more extensive corporate and 
industrial policy. Strategies allied to pay disclosure, such as enforceable 
pay ratios, worker representation on company boards, new taxation 
measures, profit-sharing and binding pay codes are essential to changing 
power relations within the workplace and society more generally and 
producing a redistribution of pay and wealth.  
116     JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 81 
 
Eugene Schofield-Georgeson is a lecturer at the University of Technology 
Sydney (UTS) Law School.  
eugene.schofield-georgeson@uts.edu.au 
References 
Addison, J.T., Teixiera, P., Zwick, T. (2010) ‘German Works Councils and the Anatomy of 
Wages’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 63(2): 247-270. 
AFLCIO (America’s Unions) (2015) Corporate Paywatch, available: 
http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-2015 [accessed 26 February 2017]. 
AFLCIO (2012) ‘CEO-to-worker Pay Ratios Around the World’, AFLCIO (online), 
available: http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-Archive/CEO-Pay-and-
You/CEO-to-Worker-Pay-Gap-in-the-United-States/Pay-Gaps-in-the-World [accessed 8 
March 2017]. 
ASX, ‘End of Month Values’, 2017-2002, available at: 
http://www.asx.com.au/about/historical-market-statistics.htm 
Anderson, S. (2016) ‘New SEC CEO Pay Rule Gets Low Marks’, The Huffington Post, 7 
May, available: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sarah-anderson/new-sec-ceo-pay-rule-
gets_b_7231200.html [accessed 8 March 2017]. 
Atkinson, A. (2015) Inequality: What Can Be Done?, Harvard University Press. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force, Australia, Aug 2017, cat. no. 6202.0, 
Canberra. 
Australian Labor Party (2017) Growing Together: Labor’s Agenda for Tackling Inequality, 
available: http://cdn.australianlabor.com.au/documents/Growing-Together.pdf [accessed, 
10 October 2017] 
BBC News (2013) ‘Swiss referendum backs executive pay curbs’, available: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21647937 [accessed 8 March 2017]. 
Blanpain, R. (ed.) et al (2011) Rethinking Corporate Governance: From Shareholder Value 
to Stakeholder Value, The Netherlands, Kluwer Law. 
Bluescope Steel, Annual Financial Report, 2010/2011, Directors’ Report, 2017. 
Bugeja, M., et al. (2016) Life after a Shareholder Pay 'Strike': Consequences for ASX-
Listed Firms, CIFR Paper No. 130/2016, available: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2876925 
[accessed 1 March 2017]. 
Corbyn, J. (2017) Speech on Labour Party Future and Direction of UK, Fabian Society 
(UK), London, 14 January 2017. 
Crown Resorts, Remuneration Report, 2012. 
Crown Resorts, Annual Report, 2014. 
Durkin, P. (2016) ‘Woolworths executives face bonus clawback if ACCC wins case’, AFR, 
22 November, available: http://www.afr.com/business/woolworths-executives-face-bonus-
clawback-if-accc-wins-case-20161121-gsu7n4 [accessed 22 February 2017]. 
IS PAY DISCLOSURE THE ANSWER?     117 
 
Elgot, J. (2017) ‘Jeremy Corbyn Calls for Maximum Wage Law’, The Guardian, , 
available: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/10/jeremy-corbyn-calls-for-
maximum-wage-law [accessed 24 February 2017]. 
Eurostat (2007) ‘Income and Living Conditions’, available:  
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/data/main-tables [accessed 
1 March 2017]. 
Eurostat (2017) Germany / Unemployment rate, 
available: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/UNE_RT_M [accessed 
18 September 2017]. 
Eurostat (2017) Supplementary indicators to unemployment, ‘underemployment’, 
available: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsi_sup_a&lang=en 
[accessed 18 September 2017]. 
Errasti, A., et al. (2017) ‘The Viability of Co-Operatives’, Review of Radical Political 
Economics, 49(2).  
Evershed, N. (2017) ‘Posting a Profit’, The Guardian, available: 
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/feb/09/posting-a-profit-how-does-the-
australia-post-ceos-pay-compare-with-other-executives [accessed 14 July 2017]. 
Fama, E.J., and Jensen, M. (1983) ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, Journal of Law 
and Economics, Vol. 26(2), 301-325. 
Featherstone, T. (2017) ‘Two strikes round one’, Morningstar, available: 
http://www.morningstar.com.au/funds/paper/two-strikes/4311 [accessed 3 March 2017]. 
Floum, J. (2016) ‘Steve Novick’s CEO tax wins close vote, putting Portland on world 
map’, The Oregonian, available: 
http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/12/steve_novicks_ceo_tax_wins_clo.htm
l [accessed 13 February 2017]. 
Friedman, M. (1970) The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, The 
New York Times Magazine, September 13, 3. 
FWO (‘Fair Work Ombudsman’) (2017) Minimum Wages, available: 
http://www.fairwork.gov.au/how-we-will-help/templates-and-guides/fact-sheets/minimum-
workplace-entitlements/minimum-wages [accessed 16 March 2017]. 
Garofalo, P. (2013) ‘What We Can Learn From Switzerland’s CEO Pay Cap Vote’, US 
News and World Report, available: https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/pat-
garofalo/2013/11/25/the-importance-of-switzerlands-112-ceo-pay-cap-vote [accessed 8 
March 2017]. 
Gollan, J. et al. (2002) Work Councils in Australia, The Federation Press, Annandale. 
Goldin, C. and Katz, L. (2008) The Race Between Education and Technology, Harvard 
University Press. 
Grabke-Rundell, A. and Gomez-Mejia, A.R. (2002) ‘Power as a determinant of executive 
compensation’, Human Resource Management Review, Vol 12(1): 3-23. 
Grudnoff, M. (2015) Closing the Tax Loopholes: A Buffett Rule for Australia, The Australia 
Institute.  
Hannan, E. (2017) ‘Union War Over Crown’s Cut-Price Pokie Workers’, The Australian, 
26 July. 
118     JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 81 
 
Hans Bockler Foundation (2017) Why Co-Determination?, available: 
ahttps://www.boeckler.de/pdf/mbf_praes_arguments_co_determination.pdf  [accessed, 20 
October 2017]. 
Hardoon, D. (2017) ‘An Economy for the 99%’, Oxfam, available: 
https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/economy-99 [accessed 3 February 2017]. 
Headey, B. et al. (2005) ‘The Structure and Distribution of Household Wealth in Australia’, 
Australian Economic Review, 38(2): 159-175. 
Herrera, D. (2004) ‘Mondragon: a for-profit organization that embodies Catholic social 
thought’, Review of Business 25(1): 56–68. 
Hill, J. (2015) ‘Images of the Shareholder’, in Hill, J. and Thomas, R.S., Research 
Handbook on Shareholder Power, Edward Elgar, 53-79. 
Hiltzik, M. (2015) ‘The right way to measure CEO pay has nothing to do with ‘shareholder 
value’, Los Angeles Times (online), available: http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-
mh-the-right-way-to-measure-ceo-pay-20150501-column.html [accessed 8 March 2017] 
Janda, M. (2017) ‘Company profits surge as wages fall’, ABC News, available: 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-27/company-profits-surge-as-wages-fall/8307178 
[accessed 14 September 2017]. 
Jericho, G. (2017) What’s Better Than a Buffett Rule?, 
available: https://www.theguardian.com/business/grogonomics/2017/may/25/buffett-rule-
labor-party-tax-debate-chris-bowen [accessed 14 December 2017].  
Kenny, G. (2017) ‘Australia’s Experiment in Restraining Executive Bonuses’, Harvard 
Business Review, 24 July.  
Kitney, D. (2012) ‘Crown moves over pay disclosure’, The Australian, 27 September 2012. 
Lanning, T. and Lawton K. (2011) Getting What We Deserve? IPPR Report (UK), 
available: http://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2011/06/getting-what-
we-deserve_June2011_7617.pdf?noredirect=1 [accessed 2 March 2017] 
Levinthal, D. (1988) ‘A Survey of Agency Models of Organisation’, Journal of Economic 
Behaviour and Organisation, Vol 9: 153-174. 
Loussikian, K. (2015)‘BlueScope workers back job cuts, pay freeze, to keep steelworks 
open, The Australian, 8 October. 
Martin, P. (2015) ‘You need how much to be uber rich?’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 
May, p. 14. 
Mayne, S. (2011) ‘Why Murdoch Prefers the American Way on Pay’, The Bendigo 
Advertiser, 17 October.   
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (2017) Household, Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey: 01-04/04 (1st Annual Survey).  
Milligan, S. (2015) ‘Workers Can Handle the Truth’, US News and World Report, 
available: https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/susan-milligan/2015/08/06/ceo-pay-
ratio-rule-will-help-workers [accessed 8 March 2017]. 
Mishel, L., and Davis, A. (2015) Top CEOs Make 300 Times More Than Typical Workers, 
Economic Policy Institute, Issue Brief #339, 21 June 2015. 
IS PAY DISCLOSURE THE ANSWER?     119 
 
Mitchell, R., O’Donnell, A., and Ramsay, I. (2005) ‘Shareholder Value and Employee 
Interests: Intersections between corporate governance, corporate law and labour law’, 
Wisconsin International Law Journal, 23(3): 417-476. 
Mohan, B., Norton, M., Deshpandé, R. (2015) Paying Up for Fair Pay, Working Paper 15-
091, Harvard Business School. 
Moore, J. (2017) ‘Bosses Pay’, The Independent, 25 August. 
OECD (2015) In it Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
OECD Data (2017) Average Wages (indicator), 
available: https://data.oecd.org/earnwage/average-wages.htm [accessed 18 September 
2017]. 
OECD (2017) Level of GDP per capita and 
productivity, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PDB_LV [accessed 18 
September 2017]. 
Patty, A., ‘CEO pay rebounds to level before the GFC’, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 March 
2018. 
Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Harvard University Press. 
Quigg, B. (2011) ‘Obama Speaks Up on CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratios’, Payscale, available: 
http://www.payscale.com/career-news/2011/12/ceo-to-worker-pay-ratios [accessed 8/3/17]. 
Richardson, D. (2018) GFC + 10: Executive Pay in Australia, The Australia Institute. 
Rogers, J. and Streeck, W. (2009) Work Councils: Consultation, Representation and 
Cooperation in Industrial Relations, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Ross, I., Markey, R. and Gollan, P. (2002) Work Councils in Australia: Future Prospects 
and Possibilities, The Federation Press, Annandale.  
Schneiders, B., et al. (2016) ‘Coles underpaid workers and cut penalty rates’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 31 May. 
Sheil, C., and Stilwell, F. (2016) The Wealth of the Nation: Current Data on the 
Distribution of Wealth in Australia, Evatt Foundation, Sydney. 
Shields, J. (2005) ‘Setting the Double Standard: Chief Executive Pay the BCA Way’, 
Journal of Australian Political Economy, Vol 56: 299-324. 
Sheehan, K. (2009) ‘The Regulatory Framework for Executive Remuneration in Australia”, 
Sydney Law Review, Vol 31: 273-308. 
Shotter, J. and Chazan, G. (2017) ‘Focus on executive pay expected to sharpen as German 
poll looms’, Financial Times, available: https://www.ft.com/content/f1733428-157c-11e7-
b0c1-37e417ee6c76 [accessed, 8 September 2017]. 
Stilwell, F., and Jordan, K. (2007) Who Gets What? Analysing Economic Inequality in 
Australia, Cambridge University Press. 
Stilwell, F. (2002) ‘Globalization, Employment and Economic Strategies’, in Lamberton, 
D, Managing the Global I.B. Taurus Publishers, New York, 33-51. 
Tan, S. (2012) ‘Companies tempt second strike with pay’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 
November. 
The High Pay Centre (2014) The State of Pay, available: 
http://highpaycentre.org/files/The_Pay_Today_draft.pdf [accessed 26 February 2017]. 
120     JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 81 
 
The High Pay Centre (2015) Pay Ratios: Just Do It, available: 
http://highpaycentre.org/pubs/pay-ratios-just-do-it [accessed 20 February 2017]. 
Toscano, N. and Schneiders, B. (2016) ‘First big pay boost for underpaid Coles workers’, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 13 August. 
Tremlett, G. (2013) ‘Mondragon: Spain's giant co-operative where times are hard but few 
go bust’, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/07/mondragon-
spains-giant-cooperative [accessed 18 September 2017]. 
TUC (2012) Worker Representation on Remuneration Committees, 
available: https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/tucfiles/workerrepsonremunerationcom
mittees.pdf [accessed, 20 October 2017].  
United Voice (2017) ‘Backpay’, available: http://www.casinounion.org.au/backpay 
[accessed 24 October]. 
Walker, J. (2016) ‘Australia should compare CEO and average worker pay like the US and 
UK’, The Conversation, available: https://theconversation.com/australia-should-compare-
ceo-and-average-worker-pay-like-the-us-and-uk-65898 [accessed, 13 December 2017].  
Ward, R. (2017) ‘James Packer could be set for $1.1 billion pay day’, Australian Financial 
Review, 23 May. 
Wartzman, R. (2011) Report to Securities and Exchange Commission (US), Feb 17, 
available: http://www.druckerinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/SECcomment.pdf 
[accessed 15 February 2017]. 
Wedderburn, Lord of Charlton (1985) ‘Southey Memorial Lecture 1984: The Social 
Responsibility of Companies’, Melbourne University Law Review, Vol 15: 4-30 
Wesfarmers (2017) Annual Report. 
Zylberstajn, H. (2011) ‘Labor economics, corporate governance, and corporate social 
responsibility’ in Blanpain, R., et al, Rethinking Corporate Governance, Kluwer Law 
International, Amsterdam. 
 
PROGRESS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Progress in Political Economy is the blogsite of the Department of Political 
Economy at the University of Sydney.  
It features regular posts by leading Australian and international scholars on 
a range of themes in critical political economy and global governance. 
Recent contributions include posts on topics such as rethinking the political 
economy of ecology; the usefulness of neoliberalism as a concept; the 
structural importance of money and nature in the history of capitalism; the 
political economic significance of the label of ‘terrorism’; and 
opportunities for reforming Australia’s manufacturing sector. 
http://ppesydney.net 
 
